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AN HEIR OR A REBEL? 
CHARLES GRANDISON 
FINNEY AND THE NEW 
ENGLAND THEOLOGY 
Allen C. Guelzo 
No important survey of the early American republic fails to give 
Charles Grandison Finney one of the starring roles in its story. He is, as 
Sydney Ahlstrom declared, "an immensely important man in American 
history by any standard of measure," and, in the words of William 
McLoughlin, "the leading revivalist of the mid-nineteenth century."' 
And yet, once we attempt to explain what made Finney so important, 
the picture we develop becomes unaccountably diffuse and contradic- 
tory. We are told that Finney was "an influential revisionist in the Re- 
formed theological tradition"; but alternately, we also are told that he 
worked out a "thorough revision of Calvinism," that he "boldly re- 
jected Calvinism," that he had "little or no understanding" of Calvin- 
ism, that he had "an Arminian understanding of the Gospel," that his 
preaching represented a "frank abandonment of Calvinism" and even 
"the ultimate denial of Calvinism. "2 
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Finney's theology, similarly, has been described as "no theology" 
at all, as an extension of the New Haven Theology of Nathaniel Wil- 
liam Taylor and Lyman Beecher, as entirely "unlike the Taylorite New 
Lights of New England," as enjoying an "original associationism with 
Wesleyanism," as having nothing whatsoever in common with "Meth- 
odism or other Arminian thought"--and even, viewing things in the 
longue duree, "fundamentally a revival of Pelagianism."3 Finney's most 
controversial "new measure" in revivals, the introduction of the so- 
called "anxious bench" during his great Rochester revival in 1830-31, 
is sometimes attributed to southern and frontier Baptist influences, 
sometimes to Methodism, and sometimes simply to "cold pragma- 
tism," while his most controversial doctrine, the call for "entire sanctifi- 
cation," is rooted by some in Wesley's perfectionism and uprooted by 
others as having "little similarity to Wesley's. " 
Little wonder that on rare occasion some interpreters simply confess 
an element of bewilderment in reading Finney: "Finney was so far 
from Edwards in his philosophical outlook," wrote William Mc- 
Loughlin in his edition of Finney's Lectures on Revival, "that it may seem 
odd that he frequently quotes Edwards to buttress his views on specific 
aspects of revival preaching. " Or as another writer tried to explain mat- 
ters, Finney simply "had something in his theology to offend almost 
everyone. 
" 
Part of this confusion over Finney is surely due to Finney himself: 
his famous Memoirs are rich in detail and self-congratulation over his 
successes as a revivalist, but curiously opaque about his intellectual and 
theological development. And his singular claim to be entirely sui generis 
3 James E. Johnson, "Charles G. Finney and a Theology of Revivalism," 
Church History, 38 (Spring 1969), 356; Hewitt, Regeneration and Morality, 22-23; Wil- 
liam G. McLoughlin, Revivals, Awakenings and Reform: An Essay on Religion and Social 
Change in America, 1607-1977 (Chicago, 1978), 125, 128; Smith, Revivalism and Social 
Reform, 108-09; Whitney R. Cross, The Burned-Over District: The Social and Intellectual 
History of Enthusiastic Religion in Western New York, 1800-1850 (1950; rep., New York, 
1965), 158-60; John F. Thornbury, God Sent Revival: The Story of Asahel Nettleton and the 
Second Great Awakening (Grand Rapids, MI, 1977), 160-61. 
4 John B. Boles, The Great Revival, 1787-1805 (Lexington, KY, 1972), 76; 
Leonard I. Sweet, "The View of Man Inherent in New Measures Revivalism," 
Church History, 45 (June 1976), 211, 213; James E. Johnson, "Charles G. Finney and 
Oberlin Perfectionism," Journal of Presbyterian History, 46 (Mar.-June 1968), 42-57, 
128-138; McLoughlin, Revivals, Awakenings, and Reform, 128; Hewitt, Regeneration and 
Morality, 43. 
5 William G. McLoughlin, "Introduction," in Charles Grandison Finney, 
Lectures on Revivals of Religion, ed. McLoughlin (Cambridge, MA, 1960), xi; Hewitt, 
Regeneration and Morality, 36. 
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Charles Grandison Finney, in his early years as a college professor at Oberlin. 
Source: Oberlin College Archives. 
in theological matters, for want of contradiction, usually has been taken 
at face value. Another difficulty in situating Finney stems from the de- 
ceptiveness of his geography. Truly a New England man, his revival 
campaigns in upstate New York in the 1820s and his second vocation as 
a theology professor and college president in the Western Reserve of 
Ohio after 1835 often suggest that Finney was a child of the West, 
where novelty and experimentation were the expected context of inter- 
pretation. Finney's rise to prominence as a revivalist from 1824 to 1828 
in western New York coincided with Andrew Jackson's ascent to the 
presidency and the triumph of "Jacksonian democracy." To the extent 
that both Finney and Jackson seemed to draw on the same frontier con- 
stituency and promote the same brand of backwoods egalitarianism, 
Finney and Jackson are often bracketed as two actors in a single deci- 
sive movement away from a New England-dominated culture-the one 
repudiating the elitist machinations of Adams and Clay and the other 
departing decisively from the conservative Calvinism of the first "Great 
Awakening" in favor of popular free-willism and "Arminianism" of the 
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second. But the greatest difficulty of all in interpreting Finney may lie 
in the failure of historians to penetrate the dense religious discourse of 
Finney and his Oberlin contemporaries or the Calvinist intellectual mi- 
lieu of the 1820s. Finney's Memoirs and his Lectures on Revivals-his two 
best-known and most cited texts-are packed with key phrases and 
terms ("retributive justice," "that theological fiction of imputation," 
"present and instant acceptance," and so forth) that are often passed 
over as Finney's stylistic eccentricities. In fact, they are rhetorical tag 
lines that situate Finney within precisely the Edwardsean Calvinism he 
is supposed to have repudiated.6 
These difficulties have obscured what William McLoughlin only 
partially perceived in his comment about Finney's perverse admiration 
for Jonathan Edwards. Finney was really the intellectual offspring, not 
of the West, but of New England. Despite the broad and confusing at- 
tributions of influence on Finney's development as a revivalist and col- 
legiate moral philosopher, the significance of his career and the shifting 
intellectual allegiances he developed throughout the 1830s and 1840s in 
his Ohio outpost only sort themselves out clearly when placed against 
the template of the so-called "New England theology," from Jonathan 
Edwards to Nathaniel William Taylor. That, in turn, lends critical 
weight to a reconsideration of the meaning of the so-called "Second 
Great Awakening" of the 1820s: reinterpreting Finney as an heir rather 
than a rebel against the New England theology stresses consistency and 
continuity rather than departure from the pattern of the eighteenth-cen- 
tury awakenings. This would place him in resistance to, rather than 
imitation of, "common-man" democracy. 
The "New England theology" was a term invented by Edwards 
Amasa Park of Andover Seminary in the 1850s to describe the domi- 
nant tradition of trinitarian Calvinist Congregational thought in New 
England. It was a movement that had begun with the Great Awakening 
and largely was shaped by the ideas of Jonathan Edwards. Although the 
6 Charles Grandison Finney, The Memoirs of Charles Grandison Finney: The Com- 
plete Restored Text, ed. Garth M. Rosell and Richard A.G. Dupuis (Grand Rapids, 
MI, 1989), 44; McLoughlin, ed., Lectures on Revivals of Religion, xii-ix; Edward Pes- 
sen, Jacksonian America: Society, Personality, and Politics (1969; 2d ed., Urbana, IL, 
1985), 69-70; Carol Smith-Rosenberg, "Women and Religious Revivals: Anti-Ritu- 
alism, Liminality, and the Emergence of the American Bourgeoisie," in The Evangeli- 
cal Tradition in America, ed. Leonard I. Sweet (Macon, GA, 1984), 214, 224; Donald 
Dayton, Discovering an Evangelical Heritage (New York, 1976), 17; Weddle, The Law as 
Gospel, 30; Charles G. Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 
(New York, 1991), 225-6, 229-30; Sweet, "The View of Man Inherent in New 
Measures Revivalism," in Sweet, ed., Evangelical Tradition, 213. 
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term later was pressed to include almost any Congregational divine who 
made a claim to reverencing Edwards's name, in Park's reading of 
post-Awakening New England none had closer personal connections or 
made vaster claims to theological consistency with Edwards than the 
spokesmen of the so-called "New Divinity." In many minds the New 
Divinity was almost co-extensive with the New England theology.7 
From Edwards, these New Divinity ministers imbibed a strong dose of 
immaterialism, an occasionalistic concept of causality, and Edwards's 
prescriptions for revivalism. But the most important lesson they learned 
from Edwards concerned the great prize of eighteenth-century moral 
philosophy, freedom of the will. In his great treatise, A Careful and Strict 
Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of . .. Freedom of Will (1754), 
Edwards addressed the great dilemma posed by Hobbes and Locke: 
how in a world of natural and mechanical law one could free human 
beings from the conclusion that their behavior was fully as determined 
as the behavior of material substances.8 
Edwards's Calvinism, entwined around the classic Calvinist dogma 
of divine predestination, might at first seem a poor platform for effect- 
ing such a deliverance. But Edwards argued that the perception of ideas 
by the mind is so linked with the action of the will, that willing may 
simply be described as being "as the greatest apparent good, or as what 
appears most agreeable, is. .. ." So direct was the connection between 
knowing and willing that the simple perception by the mind of what 
Edwards called a "motive" is sufficient to trigger a volition. Hence, 
Edwards reasoned, if God presents appropriate motives to human per- 
ception, the close connection between perception and willing will guar- 
antee the appropriate response, without God ever having to impose any 
kind of physical or material power upon a human subject.9 
For those who were unconvinced that this relieved Calvinism of 
charges of "necessity" and "inability," Edwards responded with his 
famous dichotomy between "natural ability" and "moral inability"- 
that all human beings possess full natural ability to will freely, even 
though their depraved spiritual natures ensure that they never will do so 
7 Park, "New England Theology," Bibliotheca Sacra, 9 Jan. 1852), 170-220; 
see also Joseph A. Conforti, "Edwards A. Park and the Creation of the New Eng- 
land Theology, 1840-1870," in Jonathan Edwards's Writings: Text, Context, and Interpre- 
tation, ed. Stephen J. Stein (Indiana University Press, 1996), 193-207. 
8 Jonathan Edwards, The Works of Jonathan Edwards. Freedom of the Will, ed. 
Paul Ramsey (1957; rep., New Haven, 1979), 144. 9 Hoopes, Consciousness in New England, 28-29; Hoopes, "Jonathan Edwards's 
Religious Psychology," Journal of American History, 69 (Mar. 1983), 853-54, 859. 
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due to a "moral inability." But far from this excusing unrepentant sin- 
ners, "moral inability" is precisely what sinners customarily were 
blamed for, especially when they possessed full natural ability to do oth- 
erwise. Edwards's disciples were thus free to call sinners to repentance 
and revival on the ground of every sinner's natural ability, while care- 
fully protecting their Calvinistic integrity by insisting that total deprav- 
ity ensured an utter moral inability for repentance by sinners unaided 
by divine grace. 
This novel attempt to have both free will and determinism required 
that Edwards and his New Divinity followers perform several crucial 
alterations in the basic contours of Calvinistic psychology. In the first 
place, Edwards's insistence that the will freely moves toward what the 
mind perceives as motives could easily come acropper on the question 
of why two people might respond to the same motive in different ways. 
By contrast, the textbook version of Calvinism, based on the Westmins- 
ter Confession and mediated through the Scottish-influenced agency of 
Princeton Presbyterians Archibald Alexander and Charles Hodge, ac- 
counted for the differences in these perceptions by the differences in 
spiritual substance between saints and sinners, which compelled saints 
to love one motive and sinners hate it. But that presupposed the exis- 
tence of a substantial moral "nature" lying beneath the working con- 
sciousness, and that assumption sat uneasily beside Edwards's insistence 
that willing was an unhindered movement from perception to willing. A 
morally depraved spiritual substance that determined the receptiveness 
of the consciousness to ideas seemed to suggest a natural inability to 
respond to certain motives that would undercut all of Edwards's elabo- 
rate insistence on human freedom as natural ability. How much Ed- 
wards felt this tension as a Calvinist theologian is unclear, although in 
his posthumously published treatise on Original Sin (1758), Edwards 
sought to soften the notion of a fixed spiritual substance by redefining 
human "nature" rather vaguely as an "arbitrary divine constitution" 
which "continually preserves" human personality. 0 
These innovations puzzled, and sometimes appalled, not only the 
Arminians and quasi-Unitarians with whom Edwards had struggled 
during the Great Awakening, but even many orthodox "Old Calvin- 
ists" in New England and strict-subscription Presbyterians in Pennsyl- 
10 Ramsey, ed., Works of Edwards: Freedom of the Will, 142, 304; John Smalley, 
Sermons on Various Subjects, Doctrinal and Practical (Middletown, CT, 1814), 328; Joseph 
Bellamy, "The Half-Way Covenant: A Dialog," in The Works of Joseph Bellamy (3 
vols., New York, 1812), III, 443; Jonathan Edwards, The Works of Jonathan Edwards: 
Original Sin, ed. Clyde Holbrook (New Haven, 1970), 399-404. 
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vania and New Jersey, who suspected that the redefinition of spiritual 
substance and a hankering to hitch Calvinism to talk about natural abil- 
ity would come to no good end. The New Divinity, who considered 
themselves the most radical and consistent Edwardseans, felt no such 
qualms. Samuel Hopkins (who had been tutored in theology by Ed- 
wards during the height of the Great Awakening) developed Edwards's 
definition of true virtue into an ethic of absolute "universal disinter- 
ested benevolence." Joseph Bellamy, with Edwards's blessing (in the 
form of the preface to Bellamy's True Religion Delineated in 1750), re- 
worked the outlines of the atonement and justification to introduce a 
governmental and unlimited atonement into New Divinity doctrine, 
and to replace the Westminster definition of justification as a matter of 
imputed divine righteousness with a 'realistic' idea of justification in 
which the death of Jesus Christ conferred, not merit upon sinners but 
an opportunity for God to forgive, provided the sinner was fully em- 
ploying natural ability to exert disinterested benevolence." 
Above all, explaining, defending and demanding the full natural 
ability of the will became the unceasing work of New Divinity preach- 
ers. Nathanael Emmons, who was often marked out as the most ultra of 
the New Divinity preachers, was so determined to preach up natural 
ability that he untied the will from any connection to spiritual sub- 
stance, and defined all human consciousness as a phenomenological se- 
ries of "exercises" upheld only by God's "constitution." He thus set 
his "Exercise Scheme" off from more hesitant New Divinity men such 
as Asa Burton, whose "Taste Scheme" retained some notion of a spiri- 
tual substratum in the form of an underlying "taste" for good or evil. 
And as they pressed to the outer logic of natural ability, they came at 
last to the suggestion that when the right use of one's ability combined 
with the demand for disinterested benevolence, then the goal of true 
Christian life could hardly be less than Christian perfection.l2 On the 
n Samuel Hopkins, "Sin, Through Divine Interposition, an Advantage to the 
Universe" and "An Inquiry Into the Nature of True Holiness," in The Works of 
Samuel Hopkins (3 vols., Boston, 1854), II, 532, and III, 17, 39, 63; Joseph Bellamy, 
True Religion Delineated, or, Experimental Religion as distinguishedfrom formality and enthusi- 
asm (1750; rep. Morristown, NJ, 1804), 342-57; 
12 Nathanael Emmons, "Man's Activity and Dependence Illustrated and Rec- 
onciled," in The Works of Nathanael Emmons, ed. Jacob Ide (6 vols., Boston, 1842), 
IV, 355-56; Burton, Essays on Some of the First Principles of Metaphysicks, Ethicks, and 
Theology (Portland, ME, 1824), 225; Samuel Spring, Moral Disquisitions and Strictures 
(Newburyport, MA, 1789), 120, 210; Hopkins, "The Knowledge of God's Law Nec- 
essary," in Works of Hopkins, III, 524; John Smalley, Sermons on a Number of Connected 
Subjects (Hartford, 1803), 348; Nathan Strong, Sermons on Various Subjects, Doctrinal, 
Experimental, and Practical (2 vols., Hartford, CT, 1798, 1800), II, 185. 
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New Divinity's logic, if all sinners had full natural ability to repent, 
there was little point in nudging them into such traditional New Eng- 
land church practices as the half-way covenant or the "use of the 
means." These practices were predicated on the assumption that the 
self could be known only with difficulty and only by a gradual process of 
interpretation based on "means" such as church attendance, Bible- 
reading, and prayer for a "new heart" in order to repent. For the Ed- 
wardseans, full self-consciousness led to full natural ability, and full nat- 
ural ability meant that the "means" became obstacles (and perhaps 
even sly delaying tactics); instead, the sinner should be commanded to 
use full natural ability to repent immediately and stop prevaricating. 
It was, quite literally, in the atmosphere of New Divinity Calvinism 
that Finney was born in 1792 in the New Divinity stronghold of western 
Connecticut. He was raised among the Edwardsean-influenced "Pres- 
bygational" church unions of Congregationalists and Presbyterians in 
upstate New York. And it was in that same context that he received his 
mature education in 1812-14 in Peter Starr's New Divinity parish of 
Warren, Connecticut, and was ordained in 1824 in the New School 
Oneida Presbytery as an evangelist. Far more than any possible Wes- 
leyanism, Arminianism, Jacksonianism, or antinomianism, it was the 
influence of this New Divinity Edwardseanism that colored his preach- 
ing and teaching as a fabulously successful revivalist in upstate New 
York, Pennsylvania, and New England from 1824 to 1832. Oddly, 
whatever the difficulties experienced by modern interpreters in discern- 
ing these influences, those who were closest to Finney saw this quite 
clearly. James Harris Fairchild, who became Finney's pupil when Fin- 
ney moved to Oberlin College in Ohio in 1835 (and who eventually 
became his successor as president of Oberlin), insisted that Finney did 
"not differ in any essential feature from the view of Edwards and Sam- 
uel Hopkins," and he characterized "the Ethical Philosophy inculcated 
by Mr. Finney & his associates of later times" as being "that of the 
elder Edwards, which makes well-being or blessedness of the sentient 
universe the summum bonum or ultimate grace, & . . . benevolence, the 
grand element of all virtue." Henry Cowles, another of Finney's faculty 
colleagues at Oberlin and long-time editor of Finney's mouthpiece, The 
Oberlin Evangelist, declared that while "it has never been our habit to 
commend our orthodoxy, by affirming our agreement with any human 
standards," nevertheless "it may safely be said that we should choose to 
name the theology commonly known as that of New England . . . and 
as, years ago, expounded by Edwards, Bellamy and Hopkins." George 
Frederick Wright, another of Finney's Oberlin students and Finney's 
first major biographer, insisted that Finney "shows many indubitable 
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marks of Edwards's influence" and identified Finney's preaching in 
1831 with Nathanael Emmons. As William Wisner (the pro-Finney pas- 
tor of Boston's Old South Church) claimed in 1839, if Finney had 
called his famous doctrine of perfectionism "what president Edwards 
did, 'the assurance of faith,' or 'entire consecration to God' or 'a high 
state of heavenly-mindedness', you might have said all that you have 
said about it and the ... church of God would have all gone along with 
''13 you .... 
The connection of Finney with New England Edwardseanism can 
be seen even more clearly if we isolate particular ways in which Fin- 
ney's most prominent teachings during his early years at Oberlin, 
when he was finally able to codify his theological speculations, reveal 
the thumbprint of the New Divinity-with, as we shall see, only one 
major exception. 
The first and most obvious way in which Finney reflects the Ed- 
wardsean influence lies in Finney's psychology of the will. For Finney 
as much as for Edwards and the New Divinity, "all acts of will are 
matters of consciousness" and can be described as the same immedi- 
ate movement from perception to action which had characterized Ed- 
wards's description of volition. Like Edwards, Finney believed that 
"mind is so constituted that it cannot but affirm obligation to will the 
good or the valuable as soon as the idea of the good or valuable is 
developed." And he was conscious in this that he was echoing Ed- 
wards: "With respect to this position of Pres. Edwards, that 'the will 
is as the greatest apparent good is,"' Finney observed, "I beg leave 
to say [that] it is exactly what the law of God enjoins on every moral 
being.... The very apprehending of moral truth concerning God 
renders it impossible to be indifferent. Once seeing God's claims, you 
cannot avoid acting upon them one way or the other." And even 
more like Edwards, Finney characterized that "idea of the good" or 
13 James Harris Fairchild, Oberlin: The Colony and the College, 1833-1883 (Ober- 
lin, 1883), 85; Fairchild, "Oberlin Theology," James Harris Fairchild Papers (Ob- 
erlin College Archives, Oberlin, OH); Henry Cowles, "Oberlin Theology- 
Heresy," The Oberlin Evangelist, October 22, 1856; George Frederick Wright, Charles Grandison Finney (Boston, 1893), 178-81; William Wisner to Finney, Dec. 23, 1839, 
Charles Grandison Finney Papers (Oberlin College Archives, Oberlin, OH). The 
pastor of the church in Warren, where Finney attended services with his uncle, Cy- 
rus Finney, from 1812 till 1814 and again in 1816, was Peter Starr (1744-1829), who 
was a theological pupil of Joseph Bellamy. See David W. Kling, A Field of Divine Wonders: The New Divinity and Village Revivals in Northwestern Connecticut, 1792-1822 
(University Park, PA, 1993), 31, 67, 120, 232, 249, and F.B. Dexter, Biographical Sketches of the Graduates of Yale College (8 vols., New York, 1911), III, 82-3. 
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"moral truth" as a motive. "I perceive then in Consciousness that 
wh[ich] are generally termed motives," and regardless of whether such 
a motive is "either intrinsically or relatively valuable or the opposite 
. . . the Will can act and must act in presence of it." The result was 
that as motives were perceived by the mind, the will responded to 
those motives without compulsion but also without deliberation. 
Hence, Finney could say that "By Free-will, I intend the power 
which moral agent possesses, of choosing in any direction, in view of 
motives" while at the same time insisting that "Human liberty does 
not consist in a self-determining power in the will" or "the power to 
choose anything without a motive, or object of choice." And this po- 
sition was, as Finney was quick to point out in his Lectures on Systematic 
Theology, precisely what "Edwards and those of his school" had 
taught, 
that choices, volitions, and all acts of will, are determined not by 
the sovereign power of the agent, but are caused by the objective 
motive, and that there is the same connection, or a connection as 
certain and unavoidable between motive and choice as between 
any physical cause and its effect. .... Such is our mental constitu- 
tion that the truth of God when thoroughly apprehended cannot 
fail to interest us. If these truths were clearly revealed to the wick- 
edest man on earth, so that he should apprehend them as realities, 
it could not fail to rouse up his soul to most intense action.14 
A second link to Edwards can be seen in Finney's treatment of 
natural and moral ability. For many critics, it was precisely the ab- 
sence of a second stage of deliberation by the will, separate from the 
first stage of perception, which imposed compulsion and inability on 
human choice. But in Finney's case, as in Edwards's, the response 
was to introduce a sharp set of distinctions between the natural and 
moral abilities to choose. The person whose perceptions of motives to 
action led to a certain act of choice was only responding in the way 
14 Charles Grandison Finney, Lectures on Systematic Theology (2 vols., Oberlin, 
1846-47), I, 27, 559, and II, 12; Finney, "Introductory Lecture No. 5, The Under- 
standing, Judgment, and Freedom of the Will," in Finney Papers; Finney, "The 
Wrath of God Against Those who Withstand His Truth," The Oberlin Evangelist, Dec. 
9, 1857; Finney, "Christian Consciousness, A Witness for God," The Oberlin Evangel- 
ist, June 23, 1858; Finney, "Professor Finney's Letters. No. 33," The Oberlin Evangel- 
ist, May 26, 1841; Finney, "Professor Finney's Letters. No. 34," The Oberlin 
Evangelist, June 23, 1841; and Finney, "Thy Will Be Done," The Oberlin Evangelist, 
July 20, 1842. 
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the human consciousness had been created; no actual physical force 
was being exerted upon it, and so it had a full natural ability to 
choose what it pleased. In more practical terms, the sinners who were 
presented with motives for conversion did not require abilities to re- 
spond to those motives which were beyond their possession (and 
which could be pleaded as excuses). Such persons had all the natural 
ability-in terms of the natural endowments of reason, eyes, arms, 
legs, and so on-that would ever be needed to respond to Finney's 
preaching. 
Finney elaborated this position for students in the Oberlin church 
well into the 1860s. "Moral agency implies natural ability," he in- 
sisted, and so long as that measure of natural ability was in possession 
of the sinner, the sinner had no excuses to offer God for not repent- 
ing. "To plead inability is to accuse God." But that did not mean for 
Finney, any more than it had for Edwards, that every sinner equally 
possessed the moral ability to repent apart from divine aid and inter- 
vention. "The true doctrine of natural ability is, namely, that every 
moral agent is really able to do whatever God requires of him," Fin- 
ney wrote in 1845, but he followed that with the explanation that 
"We are not able to work out that which is good by virtue of possess- 
ing the powers of a moral being, independently of divine light." 
Those lacking moral ability might conceivably have all the natural 
ability in the world, but they would never be able to repent without a 
divinely wrought change in their moral inability; and yet, so long as 
natural ability was available, the sinner could still be held fully ac- 
countable for sinfulness and exhorted to respond and submit to God. 
"A moral agent can resist any and every truth" and moral agency 
"implies power to resist any degree of motive that may be brought to 
bear upon the mind," Finney cheerfully conceded with one hand, 
and then with the other promptly added, "whether any man ever did 
or ever will as a matter of fact, resist all truth, is entirely another 
question." For those in his New York City lecture audiences in 1837 
who scoffed that this was merely trifling with words-that any inabil- 
ity meant that the will was no longer free nor the sinner responsible- 
Finney had one quick solution, and that was to refer them back to 
Jonathan Edwards: 
Here some may object, that if there is a natural ability to be per- 
fect, there is a moral inability, which comes to the same thing, for 
inability is inability, call it what you will, and if we have moral 
inability, we are as really unable as if our inability was natu- 
ral.... The true distinction between natural ability and moral 
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ability, is this: natural ability relates to the powers and faculties of 
the mind; Moral ability only to the will. Moral inability is nothing 
less than unwillingness to do a thing. So it is explained by Presi- 
dent Edwards, in his Treatise on the Will, and by writers on the 
subject. 15 
That still left Finney with one other problem, for which he found 
an Edwardsean solution, and that was to explain what caused this 
peculiar moral inability to operate in sinners in the first place. While 
the Taste Schemers among the Edwardseans preferred to explain this 
moral inability by tinkering with the notion of a depraved underlying 
spiritual substance, Finney took the route of the most radical Exercis- 
ers and abolished any notion of a moral "taste" or "nature" below 
the horizon of consciousness which controlled moral outcomes. "No 
act is a moral act, but an ultimate act, choice, or intention of the 
Will," Finney explained in the Oberlin Evangelist in 1857: 
Many old divines hold that there is such a thing as original sin, 
which however is not transgression of law-is not voluntary action 
of any sort, but is a certain sinfulness in the very substance of the 
soul. They hold that all the faculties, parts and powers of the soul 
are sinful; and this sinfulness they call original sin. This however is 
not God's teaching, but man's. 
To allow any "natural" faculty or endowment the power to con- 
trol a moral function like choice was merely to impose natural inabil- 
ity, which would have subverted the whole Edwardsean enterprise. 
Therefore, Finney struggled to eliminate all reference to the supposed 
moral content of such "dispositions" or "substances" on the grounds 
that consciousness found no evidence of their existence. Furthermore, 
such natural faculties as consciousness did attest to (such as the sensi- 
bilities, the judgment, or the intellect) had to be zoned off as morally 
neutral, lest they, too, turn into natural inabilities which the sinner 
could plead as excuses. "If it is true, as they pretend, that God has 
given them a nature which is itself sinful, and the necessary actings of 
15 McLoughlin, ed., Lectures on Revivals of Religion, 17; Finney, "Lecture By 
Professor Finney," The Oberlin Evangelist, Jan. 4, 1843; Finney, "Where Sin Occurs 
God Cannot Wisely Prevent It," The Oberlin Evangelist, Aug. 2, 1854; Finney, Lectures 
to Professing Christians (New York, 1837), 256, 312-13; Sermon outlines, 1860 and 
1869, Finney Papers; Finney, "Dependence on Christ," The Oberlin Evangelist, Feb. 
26, 1845; and Finney, "Grieving the Holy Spirit," The Oberlin Evangelist, Dec. 4, 
1839. 
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their nature are sin," Finney warned, "it is a good excuse for sin, 
and in the face of heaven and earth, and at the day of judgment, will 
be a good plea in justification."16 
Only the will could be characterized as "sinful" or not-which 
was, of course, precisely what moral inability rather than natural ina- 
bility was all about. "All virtue & vice are voluntary dispositions," Finney 
argued, and belong only to the will, not a substantial "nature": 
The common old school [Presbyterian] notion that sin and holiness 
consist in the constitutional states or appetites of the mind, and lie 
back of voluntary intention, is a demonstration that they have not the 
true idea of religion. ... I trust that many of them know by their 
own consciousness, what true devotedness to God is, but in theoriz- 
ing, they make . . . sin and holiness, instead of consisting in choice 
or ultimate intention, lie in the involuntary appetites and propensi- 
ties. 
Finney did not deny the existence of such "appetites and propensi- 
ties," but he did deny that these "appetites," together with other 
natural psychological endowments as "reason" and "sensibility," 
could have moral content or be characterized as morally sinful in and 
of themselves. Moral character belonged only to the will. "Sin must 
be voluntary," Finney declared, "The fact is there is either no sin or 
there is voluntary sin. . . . They consist in the active state of the will, 
and there can be no sin or holiness that does not consist in choice." 
Even when, in his first published sermon, Finney announced that sin- 
ners were "bound to change their own hearts," he was careful to add 
that his use of the term heart "is figurative" and is only "that deepseated 
but voluntary preference of the mind, which lies back of all its other voluntary 
affections and emotions, andfrom which they take their character." Far from 
distancing Finney from orthodox New England Calvinism, this was 
precisely what bound him to the most radical strain of the New Divin- 
ity, for it was Nathanael Emmons (and not Finney) who had first 
dared to preach sermons that confidently called sinners to change 
their own hearts. And Finney, like the New Divinity, was eager to 
proclaim to the readers of his theology lectures that "the doctrine we 
16 Finney, Lectures on Systematic Theology, I, 63; Finney, "Awaking from the 
Sleep of Spiritual Death," The Oberlin Evangelist, Sept. 24, 1851; and Finney, Lectures 
to Professing Christians, 211-12. 
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have thus laid down, agrees with that which President Edwards urges 
in his Treatise on the Will, Part III. Sec. IV. '17 
Viewed in isolation, it is not difficult to see how Finney's inces- 
sant exhortations to sinners to use their natural ability to repent and 
make themselves new hearts could be read as a leap away from Cal- 
vinism. But those exhortations were not meant to be taken by them- 
selves and by his recourse to the sovereignty of God Finney revealed 
another legacy of Jonathan Edwards. When Finney wrote that "Men 
become Christians by means of persuasion," for example, he tacked on the 
disclaimer: 
Now here I do not by any means intend to say that this persuasion 
is merely human. Far otherwise. It is far more divine than human. 
There is such an interposition of divine agency as sets truth in or- 
der before the mind, and brings forth its strength. Thus to human 
persuasion is superadded the divine. Yet the influence is altogether 
of a moral nature. 
Admittedly, Finney spent so much effort foregrounding the natu- 
ral ability of the human will that it is easy to lose sight of the back- 
ground of divine sovereignty he took for granted. But this, once 
again, only reflected how much Finney owed to the tactics of the New 
Divinity, who used Edwards's famous natural ability/moral inability 
dichotomy as a ticket to preach the full range of natural human ability 
as though free will was as boundless as the imagination. Moral inabil- 
ity, Edwardseans asserted, was the explanation for why natural ability 
was not being exercised, and thus they loosed themselves from the 
imputation that Calvinism intended passivity and inaction. There is 
no sense in which the Finney who brought down the terrifying fire of 
revival on New York in the 1820s and 1830s ever exceeded the pro- 
pensity of the New Divinity to press the rhetorical boundaries of nat- 
ural ability and still come up with what Nathanael Emmons called 
"consistent Calvinism." 
17 Sermon outline, 1868, in Finney Papers; Finney, Lectures on Systematic Theol- 
ogy, I, 186, and II, 112-13; Finney, "Danger of Delusion," The Oberlin Evangelist, 
Aug. 17, 1842; Finney, "Sinners Bound to Change Their Own Hearts," in Sermons 
on Important Subjects (New York, 1836), 8; Emmons, "It is the Duty of Sinners to 
Make Them a new Heart," in Sermons on Various Important Subjects of Christian Doctrine 
and Practice (Boston, 1812), 170-84. Emmons, like Finney, defines this new heart as 
consisting "in gracious exercises. . .which are called new, because they never existed 
in the sinner, before he became a new creature, or turned from sin to holiness" and 
therefore "sinners are not passive, but active, in regeneration" (172, 178). 
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All the while that Finney challenged sinners to change their own 
hearts (through their natural ability), he also insisted that "without 
[God's] agency . .. we should do nothing to recover ourselves out of 
the snare of the devil." Freedom of the will, as Finney reminded his 
hearers in 1843, "consists in the power, not to choose without mo- 
tives, but to choose one way or another, in view of any given mo- 
tive," and the ultimate reason why one motive is chosen over another 
is because God "actually works in them to will and to do." This ap- 
plied, not only to individual human choice, but to the operation of 
the entire universe. "God must and will govern the universe. This he 
will do, whether you consent to it or not. . . . He will dispose of you 
for his own glory, whether you consent or not." When pressed to give 
theological definition to this "universal providence," Finney had no 
hesitation offering a fairly conventional Calvinistic description of the 
order of the divine decrees. "But the question will arise," Finney 
wrote in 1847, "was election in the order of nature subsequent to or- 
did it precede the Divine foreknowledge?" The customary non-Cal- 
vinistic response would have been to make the divine "foreknowl- 
edge" prior to the actual election, so that God "elects" those whom 
he already knows will choose him; but Finney insisted that "his 
knowing who would be saved must have been . . . subsequent to his 
election or determination to save them, and dependent upon that de- 
termination." In terms that would have unsettled the Wesleyans with 
whom he is grouped so often and unaccountably, Finney wrote 
God exercises a universal providence, embracing all events that 
ever did or ever will occur in all worlds. . . . All future events . . . 
are really as certain before they come to pass as they will ever be, 
and they are as truly and perfectly known as certain by God as they 
ever will be. ... Whatever of contingency and uncertainty there 
may be respecting them in some respects, yet in point of fact, all 
events are certain, and there is no real uncertainty in respect to any 
event that ever did or will occur.18 
Like the preachers of the New Divinity, Finney developed from 
all this reasoning a peculiar penchant for a double vocabulary of radi- 
cal free-willism and radical Calvinism, and only in the Edwardsean 
18 Bruce Stephens, The Holy Spirit in American Protestant Thought, 1750-1850 
(Lewiston, NY, 1992), 47-9; Finney, "The Holiness of Christians in the Present 
Life," The Oberlin Evangelist, Mar. 29 and June 21, 1843; Finney, "Submission to 
God," The Oberlin Evangelist, Jan. 20, 1841; Finney, Lectures on Systematic Theology II, 
426, 437, 511. 
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context of the natural ability/moral inability dichotomy did that vo- 
cabulary show its intellectual consistency. "Religion is the work of 
man," Finney announced in his Lectures on Revivals of Religion in New 
York City in 1835; but by that he meant only that it was "something 
for man to do" because human beings have the natural ability to re- 
pent and are held accountable for it. "The question is not whether as 
a matter of fact men ever do obey God without the gracious influence 
of the Holy Spirit," Finney explained a decade later, "I hold that 
they do not." Good works, Finney argued were "in one sense our 
works, because we do them by our voluntary agency;" but on the 
other side of this vocabulary, Finney just as strictly added that good 
works were not "from ourselves, nor in any way by our own agency 
without God. . . . God was the moving cause of all." In fact, when 
people attempted to achieve salvation on their own, Finney fully ex- 
pected they would stumble upon their moral inability, and the result- 
ing frustration over their own religious impotence would mark the 
real moment of spiritual enlightenment for them. "The history of 
every self-righteous sinner's conversion and every anxious Christian's 
sanctification would develop this truth-that deliverance cometh not 
until their self-righteous efforts were proved, by their own experience, 
to be utterly vain, and abandoned as useless, and the whole subject 
thrown upon the sovereign mercy of God." In the end, this act of 
"submitting a subject to the sovereign mercy of God is that very act 
of faith, which they should have put forth long before, but which they 
would not exercise until every other means had been tried in vain." 
Only when sinners came to appreciate the true depths of their moral 
inability were they existentially ready to submit to God. At that mo- 
ment conversion took place, not by human design or initiative, but by 
"God's special agency by his Holy Spirit": 
Having direct access to the mind, and knowing infinitely well the 
whole history and state of each individual sinner, He employs that 
truth which is best adapted to his particular case, and then drives it 
home with Divine power.... God makes it clear before their 
minds, and pours in upon their souls a blaze of convincing light 
which they cannot withstand; and they yield to it, obey God, and 
are saved.19 
19 Finney, Lectures on Systematic Theology, II, 38; Finney, Lectures to Professing 
Christians, 330; McLoughlin , ed., Lectures on Revivals of Religion, 9, 17-18; Finney, 
"Faith," The Oberlin Evangelist, Jan. 16, 1839. 
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Thus when Finney called restless "inquirers" to his notorious in- 
novation, the "anxious bench," in the 1831 Rochester revivals, the 
gesture itself might have been borrowed from Methodist or Baptist 
practice but the rationalization Finney offered was pure New Divin- 
ity. Those who "were truly willing to give up sin"-to exercise their 
natural ability-"would not hesitate to pledge themselves to do it, 
and to have all the world know that they had done it" as evidence of 
a new moral ability to obey God. If the sinner was "not willing to do 
so small a thing as that," then he was not willing "to do anything, and 
there he is, brought out before his own conscience," and incidentally 
shown to be bankrupt of moral ability. The "anxious bench" was 
intended by Finney largely to illustrate the sinner's natural ability to 
repent and thereby highlight the sinner's greater culpability in not 
yielding morally to God. "If men who were under conviction refused 
to come forward publicly and renounce their sins, and give them- 
selves to God, this fact disclosed to them more clearly the pride of 
their hearts," Finney commented in his Memoirs. "If, on the other 
hand, they broke over all those considerations that stood in the way of 
their doing it, it was taking a great step." When Finney announced 
four years later that a revival of religion "is not a miracle, nor de- 
pendent on a miracle, in any sense," but "a purely philosophical re- 
sult of the right use of the constituted means," he was speaking in the 
context of natural ability: sinners may not demand miracles, but they 
had all the means at their disposal to produce a revival. In the context 
of moral inability, however, Finney immediately reversed the picture 
to insist that "man alone never does or can convert a sinner," and he 
added that calling revivals non-miraculous was merely a way of 
stressing that sinners "do not become Christian by virtue of any 
physical change in the substance of either body or soul."20 
Finney's quarrel was not with Calvinism, if by Calvinism we 
mean the unrestricted ordering of all events, the moral depravity of 
all human beings, and the priority of divine rather than human initia- 
tive in salvation. Even as late as his Lectures on Systematic Theology in 
20 Finney, Lectures to Professing Christians, 128; Rosell and Dupuis, eds., Memoirs 
of Charles Grandison Finney, , 320-21; McLoughlin, ed., Lectures on Revivals, 12-14, 267- 
68; Finney, "Converting Sinners a Duty," The Oberlin Evangelist, Jan. 4, 1854; 
Finney, "On Being Almost Persuaded to be Christians," The Oberlin Evangelist, Mar. 
14, 1855. See especially W.M. Barbour's observation on Finney's well-known com- 
ment on the non-miraculous nature of revivals, which underscores that Finney's in- 
tention was simply to describe human responsibility, not human autonomy. Barbour, 
"The Oberlin Theology," in The Oberlin Jubilee, 1833-1883 (Oberlin, 1883), 38. 
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The Broadway Tabernacle in New York City, completed in 1836 for Finney on 
plans he himself drew up. Finney had already begun teaching summer-term the- 
ology courses at Oberlin College in 1835, while remaining a New York City pas- 
tor and residing in New York in the winter months. He was the pastor of the 
Broadway Tabernacle only until April, 1837, when he left New York perma- 
nently to teach at Oberlin. 
Source: Oberlin College Archives. 
the late 1840s, Finney taught "that none but the elect are converted. 
For all who are, or will be saved, are saved by God, and saved by 
design, and in accordance with an eternal design, and of course they 
were elected to salvation from eternity." True, Finney left Presbyteri- 
anism in March 1836 to become a Congregationalist; but the decision 
was generated by the political concerns of organizing the Broadway 
Tabernacle, not by an abandonment of Calvinistic theology. He de- 
nounced "low Arminianism" as "a manifest absurdity," and described 
"Antinomianism and Arminianism" as the "two extremes" between 
which converts "must learn to steer, or they will certainly make ship- 
wreck of their faith." Like the New Divinity, he did have a genuine 
quarrel with Old School Presbyterians; but the Old School Presbyteri- 
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anism of the Princeton theologians did not constitute the only legitimate 
Calvinist expression in the early American republic, and Finney's con- 
troversy with "Calvinism" really was an intramural quarrel between 
two domestic strains, the Edwardsean and the Princetonian. 
Finney's early debates with his first theological mentor in Adams, 
New York, the Old School Princetonian George Washington Gale, 
were not debates about Calvinism but about which Calvinism; and those 
debates Finney had with Old School Presbyterians down through the 
years revolved around precisely those points on which Hopkins, Bel- 
lamy, and the New Divinity long ago had parted company with Prince- 
ton: that the human self was completely conscious of all of its ideas, that 
there could be no "sinful" nature underlying conscious ideas and voli- 
tions, that the classic Old School doctrine of a limited atonement cre- 
ated a natural inability that encouraged passivity, and that a forensic, 
imputed righteousness induced antinomianism and presumption. 
George Washington Gale "was a Princeton man" and "held to the 
Presbyterian doctrine of original sin, or that the human constitution was 
morally depraved . . . from the fact of a nature sinful in itself." Finney's 
response was to make the same case Joseph Bellamy had made for an 
unlimited and governmental atonement, and to do it (as George Freder- 
ick Wright noticed) in terms borrowed from Jonathan Edwards the 
Younger: 
I delivered two lectures upon the Atonement. In these I think I fully 
succeeded in showing that the Atonement did not consist in the literal 
payment of the debt of sinners ... that it simply rendered the salva- 
tion of all men possible, and did not of itself lay God under any obliga- 
tion to save anybody . . . but on the contrary, that Christ died simply 
to remove an insurmountable obstacle out of the way of God's forgiv- 
ing sinners; so as to render it possible for him to proclaim a universal 
Amnesty ... and therefore rendered it safe for God to pardon sin, and 
to pardon the sins of any man, and of all men, who would repent and 
believe in Christ. 21 
21 Finney, Lectures on Systematic Theology, I, 412, 417, 421, and II, 576, 578, 579; 
Finney, "Sinners Bound to Change Their Own Hearts," in Sermons on Important Sub- 
jects, 17; Rosell and Dupuis, eds., Memoirs Of Charles Grandison Finney, 44, 51, 105-6, 
364, 507; and Finney, "Professor Finney's Letters-No. 15," The Oberlin Evangelist, 
May 6, 1840; Clyde Holbrook, The Ethics of Jonathan Edwards: Morality and Aesthetics 
(Ann Arbor, MI, 1973), 125-33; Lefferts A. Loetscher, Facing the Enlightenment and 
Pietism: Archibald Alexander and the Founding of Princeton Theological Seminary (Westport, 
CT, 1983), 197-206; James Waddell Alexander, The Life of Archibald Alexander, D.D. 
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In fact, from that point onwards, Finney's preaching and teaching 
became a virtual litany of New Divinity shibboleths. Like Hopkins, Fin- 
ney preached that "all religion consists in disinterested benevolence" 
and he described conversion in the most basic Edwardsean sense, as "a 
change from selfishness to benevolence . . . to an absorbing and con- 
trolling desire of the happiness and glory of God and his kingdom." 
Like Hopkins again, this involved a thorough-going moral rigorism. If 
"benevolence is an honest and disinterested consecration of the whole be- 
ing" to God, then anything less than an "impartial, a disinterested 
choice of the highest good of being-not some parts of it-not of self- 
but of being in general" was the only acceptable rule for Christian be- 
havior, and "every pretended conversion, that does not result in shap- 
ing the man's business, and life, and spirit, in conformity with this 
precept, is a spurious conversion." With no half-way point between vir- 
tue and selfishness, "there can be but two classes of mankind, in respect 
to moral character," Finney concluded, and these were simply "saints 
or sinners; holy or unholy; spiritual or carnal; children of God or chil- 
dren of the devil." Hence, like Nathanael Emmons, Finney attacked 
even the noblest or the most mundane works of the unregenerate as sin: 
even the "plowing of the wicked is sin. ... Until you repent you can do 
nothing but sin." 
The Sinner should be told plainly, at once, what he must do or die; 
and he should be told nothing that does not include a right state of 
heart. Whatever you may do, that does not include a right heart, is 
sin. Whether you read the Bible or not, it is sin, so long as you re- 
main in rebellion. Whether you go to meeting, or stay away, whether 
you pray or not, it is nothing but rebellion, every moment. 
And, like Hopkins once more, alongside rigorism sat immediatism. The 
intellectual dynamic of natural ability left no room for half-way cove- 
nants, gradualism in conversion, or parish nurture through the "use of 
(New York, 1854), 237-56, 425, 495, 685; Charles Hodge, The Constitutional History of 
the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (2 vols., Philadelphia, 1851), I, 41- 
63; Archibald Alexander Hodge, The Atonement (1867; rep. Philadelphia, 1907), 327- 
46; Benjamin Warfield, Perfectionism, ed. Samuel Craig (Philadelphia, 1958), 18-19, 
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Theology," in Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience, ed. Nathan 0. Hatch and 
Harry S. Stout (New Haven, 1988), 261-62; Wright, Charles Grandison Finney, 22. See 
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the means" of grace. "Anxious" inquirers who crept up to Finney to 
ask what steps they might take toward conversion were told that they 
were only disguising their unwillingness to repent behind a false inabil- 
ity; sinners with full natural ability should use it at once. "Knowing 
your duty, you have but the one thing to do, PERFORM IT," Finney 
roared. The Old Schoolers might not like this, but as Finney wrote to 
Theodore Dwight Weld from Philadelphia in 1828, "The fact is that we 
are all hereticks, alias Hopkinsians who don't sit quietly down in a cor- 
ner ... and wait God's time."22 
But the most controversial application of the logic of the New Di- 
vinity was Finney's development of the doctrine of perfection, or "en- 
tire sanctification." It was this that attracted most of the accusations 
that Oberlin was the nursery of "a considerable departure from the ac- 
cepted orthodox faith" and that generated "such a spirit of heresy hunt- 
ing and such awful effort to put down the Oberlin heresy" that the 
Oberliners were forced to organize their own Congregational associa- 
tion just to get the College's graduates ordained. But Oberlin perfec- 
tionism was also a conclusion which moved entirely on the suppositions, 
and sometimes the actual examples, of the New Divinity. On one level, 
perfectionism was simply a logical extension of the old Hopkinsian dis- 
interested benevolence, for how could anyone be given over to "abso- 
lute and universal self-renunciation" without understanding "that 
every sinful indulgence must be crucified, and Christ become all in all 
to our life and happiness"? But for Finney, the logic of perfectionism 
was even more clearly an extension of natural ability; for if one pos- 
sessed a natural ability to repent, one ipso facto possessed a natural abil- 
22 Finney, Lectures to Professing Christians, 177; Finney, "Sinners Bound to 
Change Their Own Hearts," in Sermons on Important Subjects, 8-10; Finney, Lectures on 
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lin Evangelist, Nov. 23, 1842; Finney, "The Old Man and the New," The Oberlin 
Evangelist, May 21, 1845; Finney, Sermon outline, 1869, in Finney Papers; Mc- 
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ity to obey God fully thereafter. "That there is natural ability to be 
perfect is a simple matter of fact," Finney explained, "It is self-evident 
that entire obedience to God's law is possible on the ground of natural 
ability . . . so that it is a simple matter of fact that you possess natural 
ability, or power, to be just as perfect as God requires." Whether that 
meant that anyone actually would attain perfection was, as Finney had 
said, entirely another question. "When you ask whether you have 
moral ability to be perfect, if you mean by it, whether you are willing to 
be perfect, I answer, No," Finney carefully hedged: "If you were will- 
ing to be perfect you would be perfect, for the perfection required is 
only a perfect conformity of the will to God's Law, or willing right. "23 
Finney also hedged other parts of what he meant by perfection, 
again according to the New England model. Because the will, and not a 
constitutional substratum, is what acts and also sins, Finney carefully 
restricted "entire sanctification" to overt acts of will. Sanctification "is 
a voluntary state of mind that the law of God requires"; it cannot affect 
"any change in the substance of the soul or body" nor does it even 
"imply the annihilation of any of the constitutional appetites, or suscep- 
tibilities," because all of those appetites are natural rather than moral en- 
dowments, and cannot possess moral qualities. In effect, Finney's 
version of perfection was a kind of anti-antinomianism, which defined 
perfectionism not as the enjoyment of a state of ineffable grace, but as 
the active and rigorous observance of divine law. "By entire sanctifica- 
tion, I understand the consecration of the whole being to God," Finney 
wrote in 1840 "Nothing more nor less can possibly be Perfection or 
entire Sanctification, than obedience to the law." Conversely, anything 
that suggested a natural inability to obey that law-such as a sinful spir- 
itual substance beneath the sweep of the consciousness, or a 'natural' 
appetite for food or sex-had to be removed from the possibility of ei- 
ther perfection or sin, lest sinners find refuge in natural forces over which 
they had no control. But the actual movement of the will to the illicit 
gratification of those "appetites" was within a person's natural ability to 
control, and control of the will rather than the appetites became the 
crux of Finney's "entire sanctification." Finney illustrated this distinc- 
tion in a letter to Arthur Tappan in 1836 in which he chided Tappan 
for pressing too recklessly for racial equality in America. "I admit that 
23 James Harris Fairchild, "Oberlin Theology," in Fairchild Papers; C.C. 
Copeland to Finney, Aug. 13, 1846, in Finney Papers; Finney, Lectures to Professing 
Christians, 255-56; Finney, Lectures on Systematic Theology, II, 204; Finney, "Relations 
of Christ to the Believer," The Oberlin Evangelist, July 30, 1845. 
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the distinction on account of color . . . is a silly & often a wicked preju- 
dice," Finney admitted," but "I say often, because I do not believe it 
always is a wicked prejudice." In the case of a someone who "from 
constitutional taste" shuns people of color, that person may not be sinning 
because "constitutional taste" is a natural endowment and creates a natu- 
ral, a non-culpable, natural inability. The real question is whether, not- 
withstanding that "constitutional taste," someone could still "be a devoted 
friend of the colored people." Finney thought so: it was not racist atti- 
tudes, but racist actions which became sin. Apart from such actions, the 
racist still could be entirely sanctified.4 
Finney was well aware that the Oberlin definition of perfection set 
him off decisively from both Wesleyan and antinomian brands of per- 
fectionism. Finney disclaimed "entirely, the charge of maintaining the 
peculiarities, whatever they may be, of modern perfectionists" like John 
Humphrey Noyes. Even hostile Princetonians like Albert Baldwin Dod 
acknowledged that Finney owed his principal intellectual debts to "the 
refined, intellectual abstractions of the New Divinity." At the same 
time Wesleyan-style perfectionists seemed eager to distance themselves 
from Finney. George Peck snorted at Finney's idea of perfection-by- 
natural-ability as "a legal perfection . . . whereas Wesleyans deny the 
practicability of any such obedience." Peck particularly criticized Fin- 
ney's preoccupation with immediate conversion, his contempt for the 
"means of grace," and his peculiar willingness to separate "a desire for the 
forbidden object" from actual sin. Consequently, Peck singled out Fin- 
ney to remind his Methodist readers that the Oberliners "do not profess 
to be Methodists, nor to derive their doctrine or phraseology from 
Methodist standards." Daniel Denison Whedon, who had been con- 
verted in a Finney revival in 1828 but who went to the Methodists in- 
stead of Oberlin, attacked Finney's doctrine as mere "New Divinity 
... on every point," full of "perplexity and contradiction." This Wesleyan 
critique of Oberlin perfectionism bothered Finney not at all. When his 
Oberlin associate, Asa Mahan, eventually embraced Wesleyanism and 
began criticizing Finney's reliance on Edwards's ethical writings, Fin- 
ney and the Oberlin faculty leveraged him out of the Oberlin presidency 
and out of the college entirely; and when Finney had to cite precedents 
for Oberlin perfectionism, the examples printed in The Oberlin Evangelist 
were not Wesley or Fletcher, but Samuel Hopkins and Nathanael Em- 
mons. "I had known considerable of the view of sanctification enter- 
24 Finney, "Sanctification" and "Sanctification.-No. 2," The Oberlin Evangel- 
ist, Jan. 1 and 15, 1840; Finney to Arthur Tappan, Apr. 30, 1836, in Finney Papers. 
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tained by our Methodist brethren," Finney wrote in his Memoirs, "but 
as their view of sanctification seemed to me to relate almost altogether 
to states of the sensibility"--and not the will-"I could not receive their 
teaching." As Finney explained to an Oberlin associate in 1839, his 
version of perfectionism "is the doctrine & has been of New England 
divines." As for Wesley and the Methodists, "I can by no means adopt 
his system & few Calvinistic Ministers, I believe, have had more Colli- 
sion with them than myself. "25 
Over time, it cannot be denied, Finney did repudiate one of the 
most important of all the Edwardsean formulas. By the time he pub- 
lished his Lectures on Systematic Theology in 1846 and 1847 he had become 
more than a little uneasy about the natural ability/moral inability di- 
chotomy on which he had so confidently rested his case ten years before 
in New York City. "The Edwardsean natural ability is no ability at all, 
and nothing but an empty name, a metaphysico-theological FICTION," Fin- 
ney wrote. Although "Edwards I revere," Finney added, "his blunders 
I deplore," and chief among those blunders was "that injurious mon- 
strosity and misnomer, 'Edwards on the Freedom of the Will.1"'26 It is 
this rhetorical turn, more than the "anxious bench" or the "new meas- 
ures," which is supposed to prove Finney's distance from "strict Cal- 
vinist theology" or "the old Calvinistic tradition." Perhaps it was true 
that the role of college professor forced upon him an entirely new frame- 
work for understanding and explaining human willing. But even this 
shift in Finney's thinking took place securely within the overall ambit of 
the New England theology, and especially the influence of Nathaniel 
25 Finney, Lectures to Professing Christians, 257; A.B. Dod, "On Revivals of Re- 
ligion," in Essays, Theological and Miscellaneous, reprinted from the Princeton Review (New 
York, 1847), 137; George Peck, The Scripture Doctrine of Christian Perfection Stated and 
Defended (New York, 1842), 176, 192; Whedon, "Arminian Theology," in Statements 
Theological and Critical, ed. J.S. Whedon and D.A. Whedon (New York, 1887), 246; 
Edward H. Madden and James E. Hamilton, Freedom and Grace: The Life of Asa Mahan 
(Metuchen, NY, 1982), 82, 102-16; Wright, Charles Grandison Finney, 181; Dupuis 
and Rosell, eds., Memoirs of Charles Grandison Finney, 391; Finney to J.P. Cowles, 
June 28, 1839, in Finney Papers. The Oberlin Evangelist cited Hopkins as a friend to 
perfection in "The Opinions of the Reformers and Subsequent Divines on the Sub- 
ject of Sanctification-No. 2," on April 22, 1840, while the extracts from Emmons's 
1823 sermon on "Perfect Holiness in this Life the Duty of Christians" (from Sermons 
on Various Subjects of Christian Doctrine and Duty [Providence, 1823], 403-423) appeared 
in The Oberlin Evangelist on November 9, 1842. On the closeness of Finney's ideas of 
perfectionism with "those that prevailed in the Congregational and Presbyterian 
Churches of the land," see James Harris Fairchild, "The Doctrine of Sanctification 
at Oberlin," Congregational Quarterly, 18 (Apr. 1876), 237. 
26 Finney, Lectures on Systematic Theology, II, 14, 27, 30. 
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William Taylor, the dominant intellectual figure of the New England 
theology in its last decades of influence from 1820 to 1860. 
Shortly after Finney gave his first series of college lectures at Oberlin in 1835, 
he ordered a large outdoor tent "a hundred feet in diameter" which was used 
variously to house preaching meetings for college students, commencement exer- 
cises, and even as a portable preaching hall for Finney and Oberlin's theological 
students in nearby towns. The blue silk steamer with the provocative motto, 
"Holiness to the Lord," was only flown in 1835 during the first use of the tent 
on the lawn in front of Tappan Hall. 
Source: Oberlin College Archives. 
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A number of students of Finney have pointed to Finney's encoun- 
ter with Taylor as a decisive moment in the development of Finney's 
thinking, and Frank Hugh Foster thought it was enough to describe 
Finney as "Taylor's true successor." But none of them succeeded in 
isolating just what in Taylor deflected Finney from the Edwardsean 
formula on natural and moral ability. This is due in part to the diffi- 
culty of penetrating Taylor's abstruse and politic way of putting his 
theological theorems on paper, but Finney himself was no more forth- 
coming in his Memoirs about his connections with Taylor than he was 
about his debts to the New Divinity. (Taylor's name barely appears 
in the Memoirs although Taylor's intimate friend, Lyman Beecher, ap- 
pears frequently-and almost always in a disapproving light.) But 
two letters which Finney and Taylor exchanged in 1832 and 1833, 
and the claim of at least one Oberlin associate to have accompanied 
Finney to a meeting with Taylor in New Haven, point to more than a 
nodding acquaintance, while from an intellectual point of view, it is 
impossible not to see Taylor's hand all through Finney's writings 
from the late 1840s and 1850s.27 
The son and grandson of Connecticut Old Calvinists, Taylor 
came of age in the 1810s, preparing for the ministry under the eye of 
Azel Backus, a New Divinity minister, and promoting Edwards-style 
revivals while also defending gradualism, parish nurture, the use of 
means, and the Congregational Standing Order in Connecticut. In 
blending strains of Edwardseanism and Old Calvinism, Taylor was 
shrewd enough to realize that the Standing Order was not going to 
stand forever (in fact, it was disestablished in 1817), and he embarked 
on an ambitious campaign to develop a mediating Calvinism which 
would harness the revivalistic energies of the New Divinity to the sta- 
bility and order of Old Calvinism. He very largely succeeded, first by 
absorbing several elements of the New Divinity theological curricu- 
27 Frank Hugh Foster, A Genetic History of the New England Theology (1907; rep., 
New York, 1963), 453; Wright, Charles Grandison Finney, 179, 196; Sidney E. Mead, 
Nathaniel William Taylor, 1786-1858: A Connecticut Liberal (Chicago, 1942), 167; John- 
son, "Charles G. Finney and a Theology of Revivalism," 340; Finney to N.W. Tay- 
lor, Jul. 11, 1832, and Nov. 3, 1833, in Finney Papers. Henry P. Cowles, one of the 
six core faculty members of Oberlin College during Finney's first decade there, was a 
theological student of Taylor's and eulogized his former teacher after Taylor's death 
in 1858 in The Oberlin Evangelist as "God's instrument in doing a great work for his 
own and succeeding generation, in bringing out the cardinal points of theological 
truth in an effective shape, so that they may naturally bear with their legitimate force 
on the human mind." Cowles, The Oberlin Evangelist, Mar. 24, 1858. 
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lum-especially a governmental atonement-and then by weaning 
the New England theology off the natural ability/moral inability di- 
chotomy and attaching it to a new explanation of human sinfulness 
and human choice. 
Taylor posed a fundamental question that had haunted Edward- 
seans of all stripes: was the natural ability/moral inability dichotomy 
merely a rhetorical shell game, a weak link in the Edwardsean chain 
of reasoning that might undo the whole enterprise? Taylor thought 
so, and he pressed the point hard enough to make Edwardseans like 
Bennet Tyler, Asahel Nettleton, Leonard Woods, and Edward Dorr 
Griffin cringe. "The natural ability of man to obey God, as defined by 
Edwards and others, has no existence and can have none," Taylor 
declared. "It is an essential nothing." Edwards's mind, explained 
Taylor, "was all confusion on the subject," and consequently New 
England theology "has been deluded for a century by the semblance 
of a distinction between natural and moral ability and inability, which 
has no foundation in the nature of things." Instead of explaining hu- 
man volition as a constant dialectic between natural ability and moral 
inability, Taylor constructed a scheme which rooted all choice in a 
human nature or "constitution"; but like the New Divinity "exercis- 
ers," he then explained that this nature was not itself sinful but only 
created the "occasion," the "appropriate circumstances," from 
which sinful actions then arise. Sin is thus "certain," but the sinner 
still possesses full "power to the contrary," and not just natural abil- 
ity. And sin occurs, not because of a divine arrangement of motives 
before sinners' eyes, but because in a world of "moral government" 
and "power to the contrary," sin is one of the unavoidable concomi- 
tants of the "nature of a moral system," which God "wisely" counte- 
nances in order not to cast the shadow of compulsion over the human 
will. But the effect, Taylor claimed, would be the same as it had been 
in Edwards: sinners had a power of choice which made them fully 
responsible for what they chose, but the actual results of that choosing 
are morally certain based on the "constitution" and "occasion" in 
which all people find themselves.28 
28 Taylor, Lectures on the Moral Government of God (2 vols., New York, 1859), I, 
196, and II, 134; Mead, Nathaniel William Taylor, 28; Taylor, "Remarks on a Letter 
to the Editors, Respecting the Review of Dr. Taylor and Mr. Harvey," Quarterly 
Christian Spectator, 1 (Sept. 1829), 551; Taylor, Concio ad Clerum. A Sermon Delivered in 
the Chapel of Yale College, September 10, 1828 (New Haven, 1828), 13-14, 24; Taylor, 
Essays, Lectures, Etc. Upon Select Topics (New York, 1859), 383. 
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Taylor's system had the attraction of explaining both sin and a 
sinful psychology without the need for the natural/moral dichotomy. 
As Finney moved more and more off the revival platform and behind 
the professor's desk after 1835, the flapping urgency of natural ability 
yielded to the elegant intellectual architecture of a "New Haven the- 
ology," where power was always available, where sin was a product 
of circumstances, and where God "wisely . . . sends forth his Spirit 
to save as many as by the best system of influences He wisely can 
save." Like Taylor, Finney now criticized Edwards's "confusion" on 
the psychology of willing. "Edwards professed to hold the freedom of 
the Will, but gave such a definition of what constitutes freedom of the 
will as not at all to discuss the real question," Finney lectured to his 
Oberlin students. What Finney feared was that Edwards's attempt to 
explain the interplay of absolute certainty and moral freedom had 
failed to avoid the suggestion of "a real inability, and so it has been 
understood by sinners and professors of religion"-especially, one 
suspects, by Nathaniel William Taylor. Like Taylor again, Finney's 
description of human choice shifted from natural ability to "responsi- 
ble action" which the sinner must perform "of his own free will and 
accord, no power interposing as such a sort or in such a measure as to 
overbear or interfere with his own responsible agency." The theology 
Finney sketched out in his Lectures thus took on a deep Taylorite hue, 
in which God, instead of moving all human action through motives, 
had to make allowance for the existence of sin in order to produce the 
truly moral beings he wants. "He saw that it would be wise to create 
moral agents, who would sin, and some of whom would be lost; and 
how could He act other than wisely without forever condemning 
Himself for wrong-doing?" Finney asked his students at Oberlin in 
1849. The answer was pure Taylorism: "God no doubt created the 
wicked or those who become wicked, because their creation was es- 
sential in his judgment, to the promotion of the highest universal 
good." 29 
Even if it is granted that at Oberlin Finney abandoned the natural 
ability/moral inability scheme to follow Taylor, this is far from sug- 
gesting that Finney had abandoned Calvinism, or even the New Eng- 
land theology. As Bruce Kuklick has commented in reviewing Taylor, 
29 Finney, "The Salvation of Sinners Impossible," The Oberlin Evangelist, Sept. 
29, 1852; Finney, "Lecture No. 7, The Existence of God," Finney Papers; Finney, 
Lectures on Systematic Theology, II, 49; Finney, "Sermon By Prof. C.G. Finney," The 
Oberlin Evangelist, June 20, 1849; Finney, "Wherefore Do the Wicked Live?" The 
Oberlin Evangelist, Feb. 13, 1861. 
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"the idea that Taylor hedged Calvinist essentials in a modernizing 
culture does not fit the evidence," and Taylor himself pleaded in his 
own self-defence that "we fully believe . . that 'moral necessity may 
be as absolute as natural necessity.' We believe that the known cer- 
tainty of action, is consistent with blameworthiness." And even if, as 
Taylor's critics believed, the "New Haven theology" represented a 
move downwards from Edwardsean purity, Finney's reflection of 
Taylor's movement still embodied the functions and effects of Ed- 
wardsean language, and that language alone imposed restraints on 
both Finney and Taylor entirely apart from their subjective inten- 
tions. Certainly, Finney's dalliance with Taylor on natural ability dis- 
lodged none of his enthusiasm for perfection, disinterested 
benevolence, and the use of natural ability. He also criticized Taylor 
for failing to endorse all of Edwards's program for true virtue, and he 
imparted to Oberlin, through the successive regimes of James Harris 
Fairchild and Henry Churchill King, an abiding obsession with the 
psychology of volition. What Finney therefore presented, even in his 
Oberlin years, was not a new, more progressive version of Protestant 
evangelicalism, but the last major public voice of the old New Eng- 
land paradigm.30 
Linking Finney ideologically to the New England theology pres- 
ents a different picture of Finney as an intellectual figure in the early 
republic than the anti-Calvinist democrat or the theological naif 
painted by Charles Sellers or Whitney Cross. True, Finney was not a 
creative thinker: Finney's "severity of tone and manner which 
strongly excited the passions of the hearers," preventing his "access 
to the conscience and the heart," was taken even in his own day by 
critics like John Williamson Nevin as evidence that Finney was a 
ranter of low mental visibility who fostered "justification by feeling 
rather than by faith," and gave "encouragement to all kinds of fanat- 
30 Bruce Kuklick, Churchmen and Philosophers: From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey 
(New Haven, 1985), 106; Wright, Charles Grandison Finney, 216; James E. Hamilton 
and Edward H. Madden, "Edwards, Finney, and Mahan on the Derivation of Du- 
ties," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 13 (Sept. 1975), 347-60; Donald M. Love, 
Henry Churchill King of Oberlin (New Haven, 1956), 38. Douglas Sweeney provides a 
spirited defense of Taylor's place within the overall ambit of "the New England The- 
ology." See Sweeney, "Nathaniel William Taylor and the Edwardsian Tradition: A 
Reassessment," in Stein, ed., Jonathan Edwards's Writings, 139-58. Sweeney pays par- 
ticular attention to a critical article of Taylor's on the natural/moral necessity dichot- 
omy, "Review of Dr. Tyler's Strictures on the Christian Spectator," Quarterly 
Christian Spectator, 2 (Mar. 1830), 195. 
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ical impressions."31 But that is not the same as saying Finney had no 
theological or intellectual stock to deal in. Supposing that we yield to 
the weight of evidence for Finney's New England intellectual origins, 
there remain three important issues about it that need to be ad- 
dressed. 
The first is simply whether such connections actually made any 
historical difference. It could be argued, especially from the point of 
view of political historians like J.G.A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner, 
that Finney's audiences heard only the rhetorical rationalizations 
which Finney provided for free will, and either missed or ignored the 
rhetorical "off-ramps" that were supposed to lead them back to Cal- 
vinism. Finney might thus be a Calvinist in the New England mold, 
but what was important was the sense of liberation from "the tram- 
mels of inability" that he gave his hearers, inadvertently or not, al- 
lowing them to leave Calvinism themselves. If so, then the 
significance of Finney's connections to the New England theology 
fade as popular audiences in the Jacksonian era freely made of Finney 
what Finney might never have intended. In that case, the revivals of 
the 1820s and '30s once more resume their conformity to historians' 
presumptions about their function as an agent of a democratizing po- 
litical culture. But even that requires a major re-calculation of Finney 
himself, since the form of Finney's Edwardsean rhetoric must contra- 
dict any picture of the preacher as a democratic rebel, inflaming the 
liberated theological masses against elite Calvinist leadership and re- 
cast Finney as one of the Calvinist elite, struggling to prod a passive 
and disheartened constituency into competition with Methodism, de- 
ism, and the many other religious alternatives. Certainly the Method- 
ist hecklers encountered by Finney in the Antwerp, New York, 
revival of 1824 had no illusions about the clarity of Finney's Calvin- 
ism: they heard Finney preach on "the doctrine of election" so 
clearly that he believed he had "convinced the Methodists them- 
selves." A decade later James Waddell Alexander easily pegged Fin- 
ney's New York City lectures on revival as "an odious caricature of 
old Hopkinsian divinity."32 Almost the only people who heard Finney 
31 Cross, The Burnt-Over District, 158; Sellers, The Market Revolution, 226; Samuel 
H. Gridley, "Biographical Sketch," in Richards, Lectures on Mental Philosophy and 
Theology (New York, 1846), 41-2; Theodore Appel, The Life and Work of John William- 
son Nevin (Philadelphia, 1889), 162. 
32 Rosell and Dupuis, eds., Memoirs of Charles Grandison Finney, 105-06; James 
Waddell Alexander, Forty Years' Familiar Letters, ed. John Hall (2 vols., New York, 
1860), II, 310. 
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as an outright Arminian were Old School Calvinists like Hodge or 
Dod, who regularly criticized New England Calvinists as secret Armi- 
nians. The genuine Arminians, such as Peck and Whedon, were 
quite sure that Finney's preaching of legal perfection and "disinter- 
ested benevolence" put him outside their pale. Finney's rhetorical 
world was the world of Edwards, not Jackson, and the rhetorical situ- 
ation he hoped to create was predicated on the Edwardsean psychol- 
ogy of the will. 
If this is the case for Finney, what about the larger context of 
revivalism in the early republic? The New England origins of Fin- 
ney's revivalism raise subsequent question about the larger interpre- 
tation of the so-called Second Great Awakening as yet another 
example of the "declension" model in American religious history. 
Following the lead of Miller, Cross, and McLoughlin, the Second 
Great Awakening usually has been described as a "transformation" 
of the stark Edwardsean Calvinist revivalism of the First Great Awak- 
ening into a new, Arminianized version of revivalism that could act 
as a convenient device for redefining and democratizing the American 
Republic.33 But if Finney's connections to the New England theology 
mean anything at all, then as much of the Second Great Awakening 
as Finney was concerned with loses its descriptive simplicity as a de- 
scent into raw Jacksonian enthusiasm. Both Finney and his revivals 
can be seen, not as prisoners of the upsurge of democratic optimism, 
but as a swelling in the sober ebb-and-flow of evangelical culture that 
the First Great Awakening set off a century before and that promoted 
for Americans a reassuring continuity with the era of Edwards rather 
than an introduction to the Age of Jackson. Even granted that Finney 
shared the stage of the Second Great Awakening with promoters of 
religious enthusiasm (such as Joseph Smith, Lorenzo Dow, and 
Phoebe Palmer) who really did represent new departures in American 
life, the rather substantial part of the Awakening which took Finney 
as its figurehead was a moment of anxiety which, like much of politi- 
cal republicanism in the 1820s and 1830s, looked backwards for reas- 
surance to a previous generation. 
Second, linking Finney to New England Calvinism also makes a 
difference for understanding the disagreements which have emerged 
concerning the relationship of Finney and the Second Great Awaken- 
ing to the growth of American commercial markets. Like his theol- 
ogy, Finney's response to the possessive individualism of New York 
33 Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America From the Revolution to the Civil War 
(New York, 1965), 4, 10-14. 
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merchants and capitalists has suffered from contradictory renderings, 
ranging from a tool of capitalism, using revivalism to assuage class 
differences, to a disillusioned victim of merchant hypocrites. This 
contradiction, however, was embodied in the New Divinity, who (as 
William Breitenbach and Joseph Conforti have shown) preached an 
ethical commitment to disinterested benevolence, moral restraint, and 
the "religio-cultural traditions of small-town New England Congrega- 
tionalism," while at the same time making individual self-promotion 
possible by including self-interest as a form of benevolence toward 
oneself and thereby guaranteeing that self-interest need not always 
turn into the war of all against all. Seen against this background, Fin- 
ney loses the look of a nineteenth-century opportunist and fades in- 
stead into the outlines of New Divinity Calvinism's attempt to 
restrain a bourgeoisie that was becoming more relaxed and permis- 
sive as America approached mid-century.34 
It was in 1831, along the track of the Erie Canal, the most visible 
symbol of the penetration of market relations in the early republic, 
that Finney's message of disinterested benevolence achieved its most 
demanding form in the public ritual of the "anxious bench;" and it 
was in New York City in 1836, in the midst of America's most ac- 
quisitive and self-interested entrep6t, that Finney was first moved to 
articulate his doctrine of perfection. "The whole course of business in 
the world is governed and regulated by the maxims of supreme and 
unmixed selfishness," Finney declaimed there. "The whole system 
recognizes only the love of self .. to BUY AS CHEAP AS YOU 
CAN, AND SELL AS DEAR AS YOU CAN-TO LOOK OUT 
FOR NUMBER ONE." He condemned the wage system as a means 
for circumventing the labor theory of value, and criticized merchants 
who would "grind [a worker] down to the last fraction, no matter 
what the work is really worth." What he hoped was that: 
the Church can compel the world to transact business upon the 
principles of the law of God. ... the law of love requires, that we 
should afford every thing as cheap as we can, instead of getting as 
34 Harry L. Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New 
York, 1990), 184-5; Paul Johnson, A Shopkeeper's Millennium: Society and Revivals in 
Rochester, New York, 1815-1837 (New York, 1978), 135; Sellers, The Market Revolution, 
234-5; William Breitenbach, "Unregenerate Doings: Selflessness and Selfishness in 
New Divinity Theology," American Quarterly, 34 (Winter 1985), 500-02; Conforti, 
"Mary Lyon, the Founding of Mount Holyoke College, and the Cultural Revival of 
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much as we can. The requirement is, that we do all the good we 
can, to others, and not that we get all we can ourselves. The law of 
God is, sell as cheap as you can-the business maxim, as dear as 
you can.35 
But the "business maxim" was what governed New York City, 
something Finney learned with especial pain after a mob burned 
down the Broadway Tabernacle as a response to his antislavery pron- 
ouncements there. Asa Mahan had warned him in 1832 that although 
"you will still reiterate the old assertion that in New York especially 
you can sway the West through the hundreds of businessmen who 
visit thither from here," the fact was that "their heads & hearts are 
stuffed with everything but religion." Mahan urged Finney to leave 
the East for Ohio, and when Finney was elected professor of theology 
at the new Oberlin Collegiate Institute in 1835 and left New York 
City for good in 1837 to join Mahan at Oberlin, he turned his ener- 
gies toward transforming Oberlin into an experiment in pure disinter- 
ested benevolence. He did not have to try hard: Oberlin had been 
organized as a benevolent colony by pioneers from the old Edward- 
sean towns of western Massachusetts (James Harris Fairchild's par- 
ents came to Oberlin from Edwardsean Stockbridge) and the Oberlin 
colony devised a highly-restrictive New England covenant as its town 
charter. With those materials already at hand, Finney built up Ober- 
lin as the epitome of Edwardsean ethics: a town with a single Congre- 
gational church which was for many years the largest structure west 
of the Alleghenies, a college devoted to combining study with manual 
labor (so that students would not be trained to look for their futures in 
the new financial markets), and no lawyers.36 
In the final analysis, Finney's connections to the New England 
theology, both through Edwardseanism and Nathaniel William Tay- 
35 Finney, Lectures to Professing Christians, 95; McLoughlin, ed., Lectures on Revi- 
vals of Religion, 110; and Finney, "The Law of God," The Oberlin Evangelist, Mar. 13, 
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Harris Fairchild, or Sixty-Eight Years with a Christian College (New York, 1907), 18; Fair- 
child, Oberlin: The Colony and the College, 18-27; and A. L. Shumway and C. DeW. 
Brower, Oberliniana: A Jubilee Volume of Semi-Historical Anecdotes (Cleveland, OH, 
1883), 156. 
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lor, underscore how persistent the direct influence of Edwards and 
New England were on American religion in the nineteenth century. 
Even more sharply they show how the shape of New England's cul- 
tural dominance in the early decades of American life cannot be lim- 
ited to its literary or Transcendental voices. Similarly, if Finney 
neither inaugurated his own personalized theology, nor borrowed his 
notion of "entire sanctification" from Wesleyan or other non-Calvin- 
istic sources, then many of the recent efforts to identify Finney as the 
pioneer of modern Wesleyan or Holiness theologies must fall consid- 
erably short of the mark. Even more provocatively, it may suggest 
that the Holiness movement in American religious history, through 
Finney, owes more to Edwardseanism and the New England Calvin- 
ist theological matrix than its chroniclers have realized.37 Finney's 
"new measures" were not nearly as radical or as Jacksonian or even 
as new as they have seemed; even Finney's ambivalence about the 
penetration of the market system had more Edwardsean reason and 
history to it than Finney was eager to admit. And taken together, 
they constitute not a new movement in American religious history so 
much as the coda to one of the oldest and most potent, the New Eng- 
land theology. 
37 See Dayton, Discovering An Evangelical Heritage, 17ff; Bruce E. Moyer, "The 
Doctrine of Christian Perfection: A Comparative Study of John Wesley and the 
Modern American Holiness Movement" (PhD diss., Marquette University, 1992), 
69-72. 
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